Modeling obligations with event-calculus by Hashmi, Mustafa et al.
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Hashmi, Mustafa, Governatori, Guido, & Wynn, Moe Thandar (2014) Mod-
eling obligations with event-calculus. In Proceedings of the 8th Interna-
tional Symposium, RuleML 2014, Co-located with the 21st European Con-
ference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI 2014 [Lecture Notes in Computer
Science], Springer International Publishing, Prague, Czec Republic, pp.
296-310.
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/62424/
c© c© Copyright 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-09870-8_22
Modeling Obligations with the Event-Calculus *
Mustafa Hashmi1,2, Guido Governatori1,2 and Moe Thandar Wynn2,1
1 NICTA, Queensland Research Laboratory, 2 George St. Brisbane Australia
{mustafa.hashmi,guido.governatori}@nicta.com.au
2 Queensland University of Technology (QUT) Brisbane, Australia
m.wynn@qut.edu.au
Abstract. Time plays an important role in norms. In this paper we start from our
previously proposed classification of obligations, and point out some shortcom-
ings of Event Calculus (EC) to represent obligations. We proposed an extension
of EC that avoids such shortcomings and we show how to use it to model the
various types of obligations.
Keywords: legal norms, Event Calculus, temporal aspect, compliance
1 Introduction
Time plays an essential role in norms, legal reasoning and in areas governed by norms.
For example many of the normative requirements in the area of business process com-
pliance concern temporal aspects of norms. Suppose you have contract specifying that
one party has thirty days to pay for an invoice, and that goods cannot be delivered with-
out being paid for. Thus you have obligation to pay after receiving an invoice, which, in
turns, requires that the payment must be made before the actual delivery of the product.
Receiving the invoice triggers (enforces) the obligation to make a payment to complete
the transaction. Accordingly we have conditions that must be achieved in a determined
interval of time or within a given deadline, and other conditions that must happen be-
fore or after specific events. Moreover, some obligations may include conditions that
must persist over an interval of time e.g., continuous monitoring of the patient’s blood
pressure and ECG during a surgical operation. Regardless the type, validity and nature
of the legal effects an obligation wants to achieve the temporal aspect of an obligation
revolves around the following generic aspects [17]: (i) the time when an obligation is
in force, (ii) the time when an obligation is fulfilled, and (iii) the time of application.
Accordingly, when business processes are subject to norms, it is particularly important
that a process complies with the obligations imposed by the norms for the whole du-
ration of its validity, meets the deadlines, and follows constraints for maintaining and
delaying actions.
Capturing the real meaning of norms is paramount for modelling and reasoning
about compliance checking of business processes, and, in general, for legal reasoning.
Also, it is important that the chosen language supports the highest degree of abstrac-
tion to model the real meaning of the norms and the obligations they define: this means
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2it should be able to model states of affairs, actions as well as (temporal) relationships
between activities. Many studies have been conducted for modelling obligations, and
various classifications of the obligations have been identified in these studies, in particu-
lar in the context of business process compliance where time is the key concept of such
classifications, see among others [13, 10, 8]. For example, [19] classifies obligations
from the legal viewpoint while [13] classifies obligations along temporal structure and
temporal distribution of the obligations. [8] characterises the types of obligations based
on deadlines, and [3] classifies obligations types as existence, choice, relation, and neg-
ative constraints. These classifications do not encompass various types of obligations
based on the time, effects of an obligation on other obligations and obligations arising
from the violations. In [7, 12] we provided a classification of obligations along tempo-
ral dimensions. Key aspects of the classification are: what constitutes the violation in
terms of the temporal validity of an obligation, and whether violated obligations can
be compensated for or not. In the classification, along a temporal dimension, for each
type of obligations we specified when an obligation comes into force and until when
it remains in force or is violated at a particular time point. Unlike other classifications
our proposed classification encompasses the generic temporal model about the validity
and persistence effects of obligations after violation. Given our new classification, the
natural question is how to model each element of the classification of obligation for
business process compliance checking.
The families of Deontic Logics (DL), Temporal Logics (TL), and EventCalculus
(EC) are widely used formalisms for modeling norms. Each of these formalisms has
a reasonable degree of expressiveness to model different types of obligations yet they
have limitations. Our starting point to model norms, in particular the new classes of
obligations, is the classical EC [14] because it provides a logical framework for repre-
senting and modeling the effects of events and the current state of affairs in terms of
fluents. Also, it has the ability to model the time when fluents come to existence and
cease to hold dynamically [5]. One may argue that modeling the deontic notions with
EC is rather well developed as several variants of EC already exist (see, [16, 18] for
further listing of EC variants), and widely used for reasoning and representing the le-
gal knowledge (see, Section 6 for a detailed discussion on some such approaches), but
we believe that the EC has some major issues for reasoning about legal norms. One of
such issues is related to the basic predicate of EC Initiates(E,X,T ). Its meaning is that
event E at time T initiates the fluent X , and the fluent holds from the next instant of
time (see Section 3 and Axiom A1 below for the details). This effectively means that
the norm enters into force at the next instant. However, for legal norms, this might not
be the case. There are cases where the norm enters into force at the same instant as
the triggering event happens e.g., the obligation to remove shoes when one enters in a
mosque or the norms is in force after a delay e.g., a complaint cannot be acknowledged
until all details pertaining is issue have been received.3
In the context of business process compliance checking, the aim of this paper is
to explore whether or not the different obligation classes defined in our classification
model can be faithfully represented using the discrete event driven formalism the EC.
3In addition it is possible to have that a norm enters in force retroactively. Thus the fluent
holds before the event that initiates it. We blatantly ignore this aspect in this paper.
3The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we revisit the classification of nor-
mative requirements proposed elsewhere ([7, 12]) and provide formal definitions of the
concepts. Section 3 provides a terse background of the EC and introduces new predi-
cates for modeling the legal norms followed by the modeling of various obligation types
using the new predicates in Section 4. The proof sketch of the provided axioms is given
in Section 5 followed by a short discussion on related studies in the problem domain in
Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper with some final remarks.
2 Normative Requirements Revisited
The purpose of this section is to recall the notions and the classes of obligations defined
in our classificatory model. For more detailed discussions and concrete examples of the
various types of obligations taken from real acts, see [7, 12]. The definitions below also
serve the purpose of providing the precise semantics of these notions and they will be
used to evaluate our proposed extension to EC.
Norms regulate the behaviour of their subjects and produce normative effects when
applied. From a business process compliance perspective the normative effects of in-
terest are the deontic effects. The three basic deontic effects –from which other deontic
effects can be derived (see, [19])– are: obligation, prohibition, and permission.
An Obligation4 is a situation, act or a course of action(s) one is legally bound to
and if it is not achieved or performed results in a violation; whereas for prohibition,
one should avoid a certain course of action(s) to avoid a violation. Obligations and
prohibitions are constraints that limit the behaviour of a business process; and both the
types can be violated. Notice that a prohibition is a negative obligation (i.e., obligation
not), thus, when we speak of obligations we include prohibitions as well. Permissions,
on the other hand, are constraints that cannot be violated thus do not play a direct role
in compliance. Instead, they can be used to determine that there are no obligations or
prohibition to the contrary.
Compliance means to identify whether a business process violated a set of obliga-
tions. Thus the first step is to determine whether and when an obligation is in force.
Essentially, a norm can specify when an obligation is in force at a particular time point
only (non-persistent obligations), or more often, a norm indicates when an obligation
enters into force. An obligation remains in force until it is terminated or removed (per-
sistent obligations).
Non-Persistent obligations are also called punctual obligation: the obligation con-
tents are immediately achieved otherwise a violation is triggered. In contrast, a persis-
tent obligation which is to be obeyed for all time instances within the interval it is in
force is a maintenance obligation. If achieving the contents of an obligation at least
once is enough, then it is an achievement obligation. For an achievement obligation,
if the obligation could be fulfilled even before it is actually in force, we speak of a
preemptive obligation; otherwise it is a non-preemptive obligation.
An important aspect of obligations that differentiate them from other types of con-
straints is that an obligation can be violated. However, the violation of an obligation
4The definition is taken from the glossary created by the OASIS LegalRuleML workgroup
http://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/legalruleml
4does not necessarily mean the termination of interaction of a business process because
some violations can be compensated for keeping the underlying process still compliant
[9, 11]. However, not all violations are compensable, and an uncompensated violation
would mean the process is non-complaint. If an obligation persists after being violated,
it is a perdurant obligation if not then we have a non-perdurant obligation.
Next we formally define the meanings of the obligations, all we need is the concept
of timeline i.e., a (possibly infinite5) totally ordered discrete set of time points. Also,
we assume that the timeline has a minimum. In what follows, we assume the existence
of a logical language L (can be a set of atomic propositions) on which the formulas are
written to model obligations and the representation of the environment.
Definition 1 (State). Given a timeline, we define a function State : N 7→ 2L.
The meaning of the function State is to identify what formulas are evaluated as true at
the n-th time instant of a timeline.
Definition 2 (Obligation in Force). Given a timeline, we define a function Force : N 7→
2L.
The meaning of the function Force is to identify the obligations in force at the n-th
instant of time in a given timeline.
Definition 3 (Punctual Obligation). Given a timeline, an obligation o is a punctual
obligation if and only if:
∃n ∈ N : o < Force(n − 1),o < Force(n + 1),o ∈ Force(n)
A punctual obligation is violated at n if and only if o < State(n).
The conditions of a punctual obligation must be fulfilled immediately otherwise we
have a violation i.e., o is violated at time n if o is not true at n (or at the n-th instant of
time in the timeline).
Definition 4 (Persistent Obligation). Given a timeline, an obligation o is a persistent
obligation if and only if:
∃n,m ∈ N : n < m,o < Force(n − 1),o < Force(m + 1),
∀k : n ≤ k ≤ m,o ∈ Force(k)
The obligation o is in force between n and m.
A persistent obligation is an obligation in force in an interval time, and can be further
classified as: (a) achievement, and (b) maintenance obligation. The violation conditions
for a persistent obligation can be derived from the violation conditions of these sub-
classes.
Definition 5 (Achievement Obligation). Given a timeline, an obligation o is an
achievement obligation if and only if ∃n,m ∈ N,n < m such that o is a persistent
obligation in force between n and m.
An achievement obligation o in force between n and m is violated if and only if:
5Notice an infinite timeline is isomorphic to the set of natural numbers (and we can restrict
to a finite set of natural numbers in case of a finite timeline).
5– o is preemptive and ∀k : k ≤ m,o < State(k);
– o is non-preemptive and ∀k : n ≤ k ≤ m,o < State(k).
An achievement obligation is in force in an interval in the timeline, and can be further
classified as: preemptive and non-preemptive. A preemptive achievement obligation o
is an obligation that can be fulfilled even before the obligation is actually in force. In
contrast, a non-preemptive achievement obligation can be discharged only after it enters
in force. The violation of an achievement obligation depends on whether we have a
preemptive or non-preemptive obligation. Notice that the violation of an achievement
obligation can only be asserted after the deadline.
Definition 6 (Maintenance Obligation). Given a timeline, an obligation o is a main-
tenance obligation if and only if ∃n,m ∈ N,n < m such that o is a persistent obligation
in force between n and m.
A maintenance obligation o in force between n and m is violated if and only if
∃k : n ≤ k ≤ m,o < State(k).
Unlike achievement obligations, a maintenance obligation must be complied with for
all the instances between the interval otherwise we have a violation. Also, no deadline is
required for a maintenance obligation insofar we do not need it to detect a violation. The
deadline signal that after that instant the obligation is no longer in force. Furthermore
it is possible to define maintenance obligation without a deadline, meaning the that the
obligation remains in force forever after its activation; for this case, one has to drop the
reference to instant m in the above definition.
The next three definitions capture the notion of compensation of a violation. A com-
pensation is a set of obligations that are in force after a violation of an obligation, and
fulfilling them makes amend for the violation.
Definition 7 (Compensation). A compensation is a function Comp : L 7→ 2L.
The intuition behind the function Comp is that it associates to each formula a set of
formulas, meaning that if a formula corresponds to an obligation, and the obligation is
violated, then the violation is compensated (or excused) by the formulas associated to
the obligation. This is formalised by the next definition.
Definition 8 (Compensable). Given a timeline, an obligation o is compensable if and
only if Comp(o) , ∅ and ∀o′ ∈ Comp(o),∃n ∈ N : o′ ∈ Force(n).
Notice that we have to requirements for an obligation to be compensable: the first is that
there are ways to make amend (i.e., that Comp , ∅, and the second is that the actions
that compensate are recognised as such (they are obligations in force) or they are not
forbidden. Finally, in the most general form, there are no temporal requirement on when
the compensations happens.6
Since the compensations are obligations themselves they can be further violated, ac-
cordingly they can be compensated for the violations as well, thus a recursive definition
of a compensated obligation is required.
6In vast majority of cases, it is expected that the compensatory obligations are in force after
the violation. However, the definition above does not exclude retroactive compensations.
6Definition 9 (Compensated Obligation). Given a timeline, an obligation o is com-
pensated if and only if it is violated and for every o′ ∈ Comp(o) either: 1. o′ is not
violated; 2. o′ is compensated.
For a stricter notion, i.e., a compensated compensation does not amend the violation the
compensation was meant to compensate, we can simply remove the recursive call, thus
removing 2 from the above condition.
The last type of obligation is that of perdurant obligation. The idea is that when
an obligation is violated, the violated obligation is not terminated yet remains in force.
Given the conditions of primary obligation an obligation may perdure no matter how
many times the obligation has been violated. The violation of a perdurant obligation re-
sults in penalty for which one has to consider the original obligation as well as penalties
associated with the violation.
Definition 10 (Perdurant). Given a timeline, an obligation o is a perdurant obligation
with a deadline d if and only if o is in force between n and m, and n < d < m.
A perdurant obligation o with a deadline d in force between n and m is violated if
and only if
∀ j, j ≤ d,o < State( j)
3 Event Calculus
The Event Calculus [14] is a well known event based formalism for reasoning about
‘events and change’ and the ‘effects of change’ resulting from the occurrence of events
over time. EC provides a set of rich axioms for capturing the behaviour of dynamic
occurrences of both domain dependent and domain independent events. Hence the for-
malism is particularly suitable to model the behaviour of a variety of dynamic systems.
It is based on the idea of the state that time-varying properties of the world, called
fluents hold at particular time-points initiated by some event at an earlier time, and not
terminated by some other event between that time period. Accordingly, a fluent does not
hold at some time if it was previously terminated and not resumed during that time [15].
In contrast, domain dependent axioms illustrate the situations under which an event ini-
tiates and terminates. In this paper, we make use of the predicates and axioms depicted
in Table 1 from [16]. The language provides predicates expressing the various states of
an event occurrence, e.g., Happens (occurrence of an event at a time point), Initiates (an
event triggers the property of the system), Terminates (an event terminates the property
of the system), and HoldsAt (that the property of the system holds at a point of time).
In addition, some auxiliary predicates to express premature termination (Clipped) and
resumption (Declipped) of an event at a particular point of time between the time in-
terval are given. The InitiallyTrue and InitiallyFalse allow for the modeling of system’s
state where only partial information about the domain is available. In contrast, the do-
main independent axioms describe the states when a fluent holds or does not hold at
particular point of time.
For example, consider the following axioms [16]:
HoldsAt(P,T2) ←− Happens(P,T1) ∧ Initiates(X,P,T1)∧
¬Clipped(T1,P,T2) ∧ (T1 < T2) (A1)
7Table 1: Predicates and Axioms of the EC and meanings
Basic Predicates
Initiates(X,P,T ) Event X initiates the variable (fluent) P at time T .
Terminates(X,P,T ) Event X terminates the variable (fluent) P at time T
InitiallyTrue(P) The fluent P is true from the beginning of time.
InitiallyFalse(P) The fluent P is false from the beginning of time.
Happens(X,T ) Event X occurs at time T .
HoldsAt(P,T ) The variable (fluent) P holds at time T .
Auxiliary Predicates
Clipped(T1,P,T2) The variable (fluent) P is interrupted sometime
between T1 and T2.
Declipped(T1,P,T2) The variable (fluent) P is resumed/initiates
sometime between T1 and T2.
Domain Independent Axioms
HoldsAt(P,T2) ←− HoldsAt(P,T1) ∧ (T1 < T2) ∧ ¬Clipped(T1,P,T2)
HoldsAt(P,T2) ←− Happens(P,T1) ∧ Initiates(X,P,T1)∧
¬Clipped(T1,P,T2) ∧ (T1 < T2)
¬HoldsAt(P,T2) ←− [Happens(X,T1) ∧ Terminates(X,P,T1)∧
(T1 < T2) ∧ Declipped(T1,P,T2)]
¬HoldsAt(P,T2) ←− [¬HoldsAt(P,T1) ∧ (T1 < T2) ∧ ¬Declipped(T1,P,T2)]
Clipped(T1,P,T2) ≡ ∃X,T : Happens(X,T ) ∧ (T1 ≤ T < T2)∧
Terminates(X,P,T )
Declipped(T1,P,T2) ≡ ∃X,T : Happens(X,T ) ∧ (T1 ≤ T < T2)∧
Initiates(X,P,T )
The (Axiom A1) states that the fluent P continues to hold until an event that terminates
it occurrs, provided that there was an event that happened at some previous time which
was a trigger for the fluent.
¬HoldsAt(P,T2) ←− Happens(X,T1) ∧ Terminates(X,P,T1)∧
(T1 < T2) ∧ Declipped(T1,P,T2) (A2)
Whereas (Axiom A2) states that fluent P that has been terminated by the event X con-
tinues not to hold until it is resumed by some other event occurrence.
The above axiomatisation can be used to model the non-deterministic behaviour of
a system thus EC is suitable for modeling obligations that can be effected by unpre-
dictable situations. However, as was noted earlier in Section 1, an obligation might not
enter into force immediately after the initiating event, but after some delay. A second
problem is that Initiates does not guarantee that the fluent in its argument is actually
initiated by the event. Suppose that the domain dependent axioms specify that both the
events E1 and E2 individually initiate the fluent P, and event E1 happens at time 10 and
event E2 at time 20, P does not holds initially and no other event initiates or terminates
fluent P between 0 and 30. This means that P starts to hold from 11 and continues to
hold up to 30, and event E2 is irrelevant to determine the status of P. Also, there are
cases where an obligation enters in force at the same time of the initiating event (and
not the next time instant).
84 Modeling Obligations with Event Calculus
In this section we propose a set of axioms to extend the EC to model the various obli-
gation classes of the classification model described in Section 2.
As we have seen at the end of the previous section, the standard Initiates and
HoldsAt predicates of EC present some shortcomings for modelling obligations. To ob-
viate these problem, we introduce a new ‘deontically holds at’ predicate DHoldsAt(P,T )
meaning that the ‘deontic fluent’, i.e., a particular type of obligation, P holds at time
T . The main difference with the standard EC HoldsAt predicate is on the conditions
of initiation. Each obligation has its own specific triggering events, and the happening
of one of those triggering events initiates the obligations. In addition, there could be
a delay (which could be null) between the time the triggering event happens and the
time obligation enters in to force. A triggering event for an obligation is represented by
trigger(Ox,T X,N ), where Ox,T X is a deontic fluent, and N the delay. Ox,T represents
the type of the obligation (see Section 2) and the time when the obligation enters in
force T , X is a variable attached to the obligation representing the content of the obliga-
tion, which can be either an event or a fluent, and N is the delay. As we said above the
purpose of the triggering event is to initiate the obligation. For a trigger to be effective,
one has to specify the conditions defining the trigger for an obligation. Also, the delay
must be specified because the delay determines the difference in time from when the
triggering event occurs and when the obligation enters into force.
For the termination of deontic fluents we introduce the new predicate
DTerminates(E,P,N,TTer ) meaning that an event E deontically terminates the fluent
P, with some delay N , at time TTer . The delay N define the time distance from when
the terminating event happens and the termination of the deontic fluent. After a deon-
tic termination an obligation has no legal effects on the execution of the process from
the time it is terminated. In the same way we have special triggering events for obliga-
tions, we have deadline events for obligations. Thus we define special deadline events
deadline(Ox,T X,Td ), where Ox,T and X are as the trigger events, and Td represents
the time of the deadline. The purpose of the deadline event is to signal the time (dead-
line) until when the obligation conditions must be fulfilled, a violation of the obligation
condition is triggered otherwise.
We provide generic axioms that we need to model the obligations. These axioms
provide the conditions for no legal effects (not deontically Holds) after the termina-
tion of an obligation (Axiom A3) and the conditions when no fluent deontically holds
(Axiom A4).
¬DHoldsAt(X,T + 1) ← ∃E : DTerminates(E,X,N,T ) ∧ (T ≤ T + 1) (A3)
¬DHoldsAt(X,Tk ) ← ¬DHoldsAt(X,T ) ∧ ¬Happens(trigger(X,N ),Tj )∧
(T ≤ Tk ) ∧ (T ≤ Tj + N ≤ Tk ) (A4)
In what follows we will have several cases where the trigger for obligation does not
only trigger the initiation for the obligation but also the termination. This means that
we have to write expression with the following form
DTerminates(trigger(P,N ),P,N,T ) (1)
9where we have to repeat twice the parameters P and N . To ease readability we will use
the convention of dropping the P and N from the arguments DTerminates, using thus
DTerminates(trigger(P,N ),T ) (2)
The reader should keep in mind that (2) is a shorthand for (1).
4.1 Punctual obligation
The axioms describing when a punctual obligation holds are the following:
DHoldsAt(Op,Ts X,Ts ) ←
∃Tt ,N : Happens(trigger (Op,Ts X,N ),Tt )∧
(Ts = Tt + N ) ∧ N ≥ 0
(A5)
DTerminates(trigger(Op,Ts X,N ),Te ) ←
∃Tt ,N : Happens(trigger (Op,Ts X,N ),Tt )∧
(Ts = Tt + N ) ∧ N ≥ 0
(A6)
Let us examine in details the above axioms. An obligation is represented as a fluent;
specifically the (punctual) obligation of X is represented by the fluent OpX where Op,Ts
is obligation modality with specification of the type of the obligation and the time the
obligation enters into force (Ts) and X is a variable referring the contents of obligation.
In addition, we create a special event trigger (OxY,N ) whose meaning is to initiate
the obligation. In this way, all one has to do is to specify when an obligation enters
in force by defining the conditions for the trigger. Axiom A6 specifies that the same
event that triggers the obligation, cause the termination of the obligation, and obligation
terminates in the same time instant when it is initiated. Thus in combination with axiom
(A3) we have the a punctual obligation is in force for only one time instant.
The axiom specifying when a punctual obligation is violated is:
Happens(violation(Op,Ts X ),Tv ) ←
DHoldsAt(Op,Ts X,Ts ) ∧
(¬Happens(X,Ts ) ∧ ¬HoldsAt(X,Ts )) ∧ (Tv = Ts )
(A7)
The violation of a punctual obligation happens when we do not have the content of the
obligation at the right time. This can happen in two cases: (a) the content is a fluent
and it does not hold at the time; or (b) it is an event and it does not happens. Notice that
we introduce a violation event (violation(Op,Tv X )).
Example 1. Australian Telecommunications Consumers Protection Code 2012 (TCPC
2012). Article 8.2.1.
A Supplier must take the following actions to enable this outcome:
(a) Demonstrate fairness, courtesy, objectivity and efficiency: Suppliers must
demonstrate, fairness and courtesy, objectivity, and efficiency by:
(i) Acknowledging a Complaint:
A. immediately where the Complaint is made in person or by telephone;
B. within 2 Working Days of receipt where the Complaint is made by email;
. . . .
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Consider the clause (A) of the Article 8.2.1 where the obligation must be fulfilled im-
mediately. This can be modeled as:
Happens(trigger(Op,Tacknowledge,0),T ) ←
Happens(complaint,T )∧
(HoldsAt(inPerson,T ) ∨ HoldsAt(byPhone,T ))
(3)
Suppose there is an event complaint at time t and the fluent byPhone holds at the same
time. Then from the domain axiom (3), we derive trigger(Op,Tacknowledge,0), t), and
then from axioms (A5), (A6) and (A3) we obtain DHoldsAt(Op, tacknowledge, t) and
¬DHoldsAt(Op, tacknowledge, t +1). Meaning that there the obligation to acknowledge
the complaint on reception of it. Moreover, suppose that we model the acknowledge-
ment as an event, and we have Happens(acknowledge, t), then the condition for having
a violation do not hold. Suppose now that Happens(acknowledge, t) is not true, i.e., the
complaint is not acknolwedged, thus ¬Happens(acknowledge, t) is true. In addition,
given that acknowledge is an event, we have ¬HoldsAt(acknowledge, t), then, we can
use axiom (A7) to conclude that the obligation to acknowledge a complaint by phone
on the spot has been violated.
4.2 Persistent Obligation
The following axiom describes a persistent obligation with a natural deadline when the
fluent holds in interval:7
DHoldsAt(Oper,Ts X,Tk ) ←
∃Tt ,N : Happens(trigger (Oper,Ts X,N ),Tt ) ∧
¬DClipped(Ts ,Oper,Ts X,Tk ) ∧
DTerminates(trigger (Oper,Ts X,N ),Te ) ∧
(Ts = Tt + N ) ∧ (Te > Ts ) ∧ (Ts ≤ Tk ≤ Te ) ∧ N ≥ 0
(A8)
By ‘natural deadline’ we mean that if no other (relevant) event happens the obligation
is in force from the Ts and Te , and that Te is determined by the same event that triggers
the (persistent) obligation.
Achievement Obligation An achievement obligation is a special case of a persistent
obligation where there might not be a natural deadline for the obligation. Hence there
are two cases for the achievement obligation:
(i) when the obligation has no termination point i.e., initiation of achievement obliga-
tion.
DHoldsAt(Oa,Ts X,Ts ) ←
∃Tt ,N : Happens(trigger (Oa,Ts X,N ),Tt ) ∧ (Ts = Tt + N ) ∧ N ≥ 0 (A9)
(ii) The obligation Holds at a particular time point deontically initiated and not clipped
between the interval i.e., start time and the point until it holds.
DHoldsAt(Oa,Ts X,Tk ) ←
DHoldsAt(Oa,Ts X,Ts ) ∧ ¬DClipped(Ts ,Oa,Ts X,Tk ) ∧ (Ts ≤ Tk ) (A10)
7The defintion of DClipped is the same as that for Clipped where Terminates is replaced by
DTerminates.
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There are two cases of the termination of an achievement obligation:
1. An arbitrary event terminates the obligation when the obligation conditions are
fulfilled before the deadline of obligation.
DTerminates(_,Oa,Ts X,Tk ) ←
Happens(_,Tk ) ∧ DHolds(Oa,Ts X,Tk ) ∧
(Happens(X,Tk ) ∨ HoldsAt(X,Tk )) ∧
FulfillTerminable(Oa,Ts X ) ∧ (Ts ≤ Tk )
(A11)
2. Where the deadline itself terminates the obligation.
DTerminates(deadline(Oa,Ts X,Td ),Td ) ←
Happens(deadline(Oa,Ts X ),Td ) ∧ (Ts ≤ Td ) (A12)
The axiom for the termination of a preemptive obligation is:
DTerminates(_,Oa,Ts X,Te ) ←
Happens(_,Te ) ∧ DHoldsAt(Oa,Ts X,Ts ) ∧
∃T ′ : (Happens(X,T ′) ∨ HoldsAt(X,T ′)) ∧
FulfillTerminable(Oa,Ts X )∧
(Te = Ts + 1) ∧ (T ′ < Ts )
(A13)
The predicate ‘FulfillTerminable’ is a boolean switch that allows for checking whether
or not the obligation can be terminated upon fulfillment. This leave us to determine the
conditions under which we have a violation of an achievement obligation. To this end
we need a special deadline event deadline(OaX ) signaling the deadline after which a
violation occurs if the achievement is not fulfilled by that time/event.
Happens(violation(Oa,Ts X ),Tv ) ←
DHoldsAt(Oa,Ts X,Te ) ∧
Happens(deadline(Oa,Ts X ),Te ) ∧
(¬Happens(X,Te ) ∧ ¬HoldsAt(X,Te )) ∧
FulfillTerminable(Oa,Ts X ) ∧ (Tv = Te )
(A14)
Maintenance Obligation Maintenance is another case of persistent obligation where it
is different from achievement in the sense that the obligation condition must be fulfilled
for every instance of the interval the obligation is in force. The (Axiom A8) can rep-
resent the maintenance obligation. Contrary to achievement obligation, a maintenance
obligation is violated if the obligation contents are not fulfilled for all the instances.
Happens(violation(Om,Ts X ),Tk ) ←
DHoldsAt(Om,Ts X,Tk ) ∧
(¬Happens(X,Tk ) ∧ ¬HoldsAt(X,Tk )) ∧ (Ts ≤ Tk )
(A15)
The violation of maintenance may terminates the obligation if the obligation is ‘Viola-
tionTerminable’ which is again a boolean swtich for checking whether a maintenance
obligation can be terminated upon violation. The termination conditions are:
DTerminates(Om,Ts X,Tv ) ←
Happens(violation(Om,Ts X ),Tv ) ∧
ViolationTerminable(Om,Ts X )
(A16)
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For a non-perdurant maintenance obligation the violation of the obligation itself termi-
nates the obligation.
DTerminates(violation(Om,Tv X ),Tv ) ←
DHoldsAt(Om,Tv X, tv ) ∧ ViolationTerminable(Om,Ts X ) ∧
Happens(violation(Om,Ts X ),Tv ) ∧ (Ts ≤ Tv )
(A17)
4.3 Compensation Obligation
A compensation is an obligation itself. The event triggering a compensation is the vio-
lation of a norm compensation compensates. Thus, we have domain specific axioms for
the two case of compensation:
– Compensation of the violation by a single obligation:
Happens(compensation(Ox,Ts P),Tsc ) ←
∃Oy,Tsc Q : (Compensates(Oy,Tsc Q,Ox,Ts P),Tsc )∧
Happens(violation(Ox,T sP),Tv )∧
DHoldsAt(Oy,Tsc Q,Tsc )∧
(Happens(Q,Tsc ) ∨ HoldsAt(Q,Tsc )) ∧ (Ts ≤ Tv ≤ Tsc )
(A18)
– Recursive compensation when a compensation obligation itself is violated:
Happens(compensation(Ox,Tsc P),Tsc ) ←
Compensates(Oy,Tsc Q,Ox,Ts P) ∧
Happens(violation(Oy,Tsc Q),Tv ) ∧
Happens(compensation(Oy,Tsc Q),Tz ) ∧
RecursivelyCompensable(Ox,Ts P) ∧ (Ts ≤ Tsc ≤ Tz ) ∧ (Tv ≤ Tz )
(A19)
For the two axioms above we have to introduce the special event compensation, indi-
cating that a (violated) deontic fluent has been compensated for, and the binary predi-
cated Compensates where the two arguments are two deontic fluents. The meaning of
Compensates is that fulfilling the first deontic fluent make amend to the violation of
the second deontic fluents and implements the Comp function introduced in Section 2,
Definition 7. Again the predicate RecursivelyCompensable is a boolean switch meant
to capture the intuition given by condition 2 of Definition 9.
5 Proof of Correctness
The aim of this section is to show how to prove the correctness of our formalisation of
norms in EC and the classificatory conditions of Section 2. For space reasons we provide
only the proof of the axioms for punctual obligations. The proofs for the remaining
axioms are similar.
First we introduce some base conditions relating to the basic predicates of EC and
the functions Force and State providing thus the basic bridge between the axioma-
tisation in Section 4 and the conditions in Section 2. (A) o ∈ Force(n), (B) o <
Force(n − 1), (C) o < Force(n + 1), and (D) the violation of o when o < State(n).
F HoldsAt(X,T ) if and only if X ∈ State(T ),
4 Happens(X,T ) if and only if X ∈ State(T ),
 DHoldsAt(X,T ) if and only if X ∈ Force(T ), and
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3 DHoldsAt(Ox,T X,Tk ) if and only if XT ∈ Force(Tk )
⊕ DTerminates(E,X,N,Ts ) if and only if X ∈ State(Te ) ∧ (Te > Ts )
Lemma 1 (Punctual). If DHoldsAt(Op,Ts X,Ts ) is true, then X is a punctual obliga-
tion in Force at time Ts , X ∈ Force(Ts )
Proof. By Definition 3 the semantics of a punctual obligation are as (A),(B) and (C).
Suppose, we have the right hand side of (Axiom A5), from this we obtain
DHoldsAt(Op,Ts X,Ts ), then from  we have X ∈ Force(Ts ), and then ∃n such that
X ∈ Force(n). This satisfies (A).
For (B), we assume that DInitiallyFalse(Op,Ts X ) such that the flu-
ent Op is not in Force function before the time. Formally, this means
¬HoldsAt(Op,Ts X,0) such that ¬Declipped(0,Op,Ts X,Ts−1). This provides Ts =
Tt + N meaning that ¬HoldsAt(Op,Ts X,Ts−1) if and only if X < Force(n − 1) which
satisfies conditions of (B).
The last condition is that the fluent OpX does not hold after (n + 1), we use the
axiom ¬HoldsAt(Op,Ts X,Ts+1) which implies that some event E will terminate the
obligation i.e. ∃E : DTerminates(E,Op,Ts X,Ts+1) if and only if XTs ∈ Force(n + 1)
which is equivalent to O < Force(n + 1), this satisfies (C).
Lemma 2 (Viol-Punctual). If Happens(Violation(Op,Ts X ),Ts ) is true, then X is a
punctual obligation in Force at time Ts , and X < State(Ts ).
Proof. For the violation of punctual obligation, assume we have the right hand
side of A7 from where we obtain Happens(viol (Op,Ts X ),Tv ), then from 4 we get
Happens(X,T ) if and only if X ∈ State(T ) which is equivalent to XTv ∈ State(Tv ).
This implies that the violation of X happens at Tv . Then, for a violation to occur,
the obligation holds at Ts , The condition of DHolds(X,Ts ) are the same as the con-
ditions of (A) in Proof Sketch 5. Then, from ¬4 we get ¬Happens(X,T ) if and
only if X < State(T ) which is equivalent of XTs < State(Ts ) satisfying the condi-
tions of ¬Happens. Whereas, ¬F gives the conditions ¬HoldsAt(X,T ) if and only if
X < State(T ) which corresponds to XTs < State(Ts ) such that Tv = Ts , hence satisfies
(D).
6 Related Work
In [6], EC is used to express temporal rules about the obligations and permissions in a
business process interaction. Rich axioms that translate the temporal properties of de-
ontic assignments and capture the effects of activities of obligations and permissions
on the agents have been proposed. The study is limited in scope because it only cov-
ers obligations and permissions while other obligations types have been left out. Also,
the temporal validity of an obligation and its effects on the violation, as presented in
our work, has not been considered. Such parameters and ability to faithfully model
obligations, and capture the effects of violation is imperative from a business process
compliance perspective. [4] provides formal specifications of commitments and pre-
commitments, instutionalised power, and context using EC. The formal representation
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of norms is limited to obligations and permissions only as in [6]. No explicit distinction
has been made between the different types of obligations and effects of violation on
obligations as we do, although the notion of sanctions has been formally presented in
the study.
[2] translates both the policies and system behaviour specifications into a formal
specification using EC. The proposed formal specifications are expressive enough to
efficiently model the systems using various types of policies representing obligations.
These formal specifications can be used together with the abductive reasoning, for de-
tecting and representing the conflicts between the policy specifications (particularly
those related to the authorisation, and permissions). These specifications, along with ab-
ductive reasoning, are useful in the sense that apriori knowledge about the event/fluent
state can be used to simplify the representation of preemptive obligations, but we do
not consider the apriori knowledge of events/fluents instead we use the notion of pre-
emptiveness to distinguish different cases of the violation of an achievement obligation
and model it in the EC. [1] proposes a norms representation approach using EC en-
abling the agents to use norms in their practical reasoning. The work considers only
two classes of norms: obligations and prohibitions for which authors introduced three
fluents i.e., f Pun and oPun referring obligation norm violation and prohibition norm
violation respectively, and oRew for obligation fulfillment. The scope of this work is
limited because it only considers obligations but ignores the obligations modalities as
we do. Also, the Anderson’s reduction view of norm which suggests that every viola-
tion of a norm is followed by a sanction [20] has been used. We argue that initially
not in every case sanctions are/can be directly imposed as under a sub-ideal situation
processes can still be compliant [11]. The notions of compensation and obligations per-
during after the violation as defined in our work are the norms types that strengthen this
argument.
7 Final Remarks
In this paper we have formally modeled the various types of obligation using classical
EC. We use these obligations types from our previously developed classification model,
and introduced new base predicate DInitiates for capturing the deontic effects of obli-
gations from when they enter into force not from when the event is triggered which in
our view is not possible with the existing variants of EC. The new predicates extend
the expressive power of the EC and make it possible to model all types of legal norms.
Currently, we are implementing this work to validate the computational efficiency of
the proposed extension to EC. Accordingly, we plan to continue this work and check
the expressive power of various formalisms e.g., temporal logic, first-order-logic and
defeasible and deontic logic. Also, we look at the state of affairs in the formal modeling
of the legal knowledge and what is lacking in this direction.
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